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ABSTRACT
Equity in housing is a major component of household wealth in the United States. Steady
gains in housing prices over the last several decades have generated large potential gains in
household wealth among homeowners. Mankiw and Weil (1989) and McFadden (1993b) have
argued thattheaging of the US population is likely to induce substantial declines in housing
prices, resulting in capital losses for future elderly generations. However, if households can
anticipate changes in housing prices, and if they adjust their non-housing savings accordingly,
then welfare losses in retirement could be mitigated. This paper focuses on two questions: (1)
Are housing prices forecastable from current information on demographics and housing prices?;
and (2) How are household savings decisions affected by capital gains in housing? We use
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level data on housing prices and demographic trends during
the 1980's and find mixed evidence on the forecastability of housing prices. Further, we use data
on five-year savings rates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find no evidence that
households engage in changing their non-housing savings in response to expectations about
capital gains inhousing.Thus, the projected decline in housing prices could result in large
welfare losses to current homeowners and large intergenerational equity differences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Equity in housing is a major component of household wealth in the United States.
Demographic impacts on housing prices can have potentially large effects on the welfare
of households that anticipate using their equity when they are old to finance
consumption and insure against risks of major medical costs. Mankiw and Well (1989) and
McFadden (1993) have argued that population aging in the U.S. in the coming three
decades is likely to induce substantial declines in housing prices1 resulting in capital
losses for current homeowners. McFadden argues that the welfare impact of these capital
losses is small if they are anticipated, and savings rates adjust to optimize life-cycLe
consumption. However, the impact near the end of life of some cohorts could be large if
they have failed to adjust savings behavior to compensate for demographically-induced
losses in housing wealth.This paper examines further the question of whether
households anticipate demographic impacts on housing prices, and adjust their savings
behavior in response.
Part II of this paper summarizes the evidence on the relationship between
demographics and behavior of the housing market. Part III contains an analysis of life-
cycle savings behavior using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and
examines the question of whether savings rates are correlated with capital gains rates.
Zero correlation corresponds to complete behavioral offset, with each increase insavings due to capital gains offset by a reduction in savings from otherchanels. High
correlation corresponds to a failure to anticipateprice changes or to adjust savings
behavior in response. Part IV discusses the policyimpacts of the findings.
I!. DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE HOUSING MARKET
A. Background. Over the period 1900-1990, McFadden(1993) finds for the United
States a correlation of 0.966 between realconstant-quality housing stock and
population.' This suggests that the force of demographics isa leading determinant of
housing demand, even though adjustments in household formationand dissolution, housing
consumption in square meters per person, and dwelling quality inresponse to income and
price may be important at the margin.
New construction is a relatively smallproportion of the housing stock: Realgross investment has averaged 5.3percent of the real housing stock over 1900-1990.
Consequently, the short-run price elasticity ofsupply of dwellings is relatively low,
even though new construction is fairly responsiveto price.Then, demographic trends
that affect housing demand shouldinduce substantial, and largelyforecastable,
movements in housing prices. The correlation ofpopulation and housing prices was 0.883
over 1900-1990.
We shall review the standard theory of thehousing market and identify the role of
demographic factors in determining stocks andprices.For completeness, we begin by
developing the standard consumer model of housingdemand, and deriving the conventional
formula for the user cost ofhousing. A comparative statics analysis of thismodel
identifies qualitatively the linkage betweenhousing prices and demand. We use the
following notation:
The GNP Residential Investment Deflatoris assumed to be a valid measure of nominal
constant.quaijty housing price.Residential Investment, deflated by thismeasure, is then accumulated at a depreciationrate of 2.687 percent to obtain realconstant-quality housing stock. The depreciation rate is chosenso that the series is commensurate with the Department of Commerce serieson Value of Net Stocks of Residential Structures. The
Residential Investment Deflator, dividedby the total ON? Implicit Price Deflator, is taken as the measure of theprice of constant-quality housing.Details of the construction and sources are given in McFadden(1993b).
2itCost of Living Index
dDummy variable, one for owner, zero for renter
RNominal rental rate per Unit of constant-quality housing
PNominal purchase price per unit of constant-quality housing
m Marginal income (and capital gains) tax rate
r Property tax rate
6 Maintenance (or depreciation) rate
8 Share of purchase mortgaged
r Mortgage interest rate (nominal)
r'After-tax interest rate, r'(1-m)r
ji Operatingcost rate for owned housing, t• (Or-i-t)(1-m)+8
A Nominal financial assets of the consumer (debt if negative)
W Nominal wealth
Y Nominal income
g Real consumption of goods other than housing
h Real consumption of constant-quality housing units
PCapital gains rate, P(P2-P1)fP1
aConsumer's expected capital gains rate
a2Consumer's variance of capital gains rate
Consider for simplicity a consumer who is endowed with initial (after-tax) wealth
W1, lives one period, and then leaves a bequest W2 in the following period.The
consumer must decide on levels of consumption of housing units (h), and goods other than
housing (g), and on whether to rent (d =0)or own (d =1).Assume the consumer's
utility function has the form
(1)1= U(g,h) +EV(WJit2).
where U is the utility of current consumption, V is the utility of bequests, and the
expectation is taken with respect to future housing prices, which are unknownwhen
consumption decisions must be taken. Although we shall not do so In this paper, itis
possible to interpret V as a valuation function, which may depend on age, health,and
mortality risk, and to allow U to depend on age and health. Then, (1) will be the term
entering Bellman's equation for the consumer's dynamic stochastic program. We makethe
3following assumptions on U, V, and beliefs about future prices:
(i) U is strictly concave and non-decreasing withV8U(O,h) =+co, vhU(g,O)=+, and
VhU(g+W) =0.
(ii) Housing and nonhousirig consumption are normal goods; i.e.,Vg07&U/VhU) 0 and
Vh(VtJ/VhU)0.
(iii) V is a constantrelativerisk aversion utility function; i.e., V(w)=
where Cand Karepositive parameters.
(iv)Allvariables except P are in the consumer's initial information set5, and
given this information the consumer believes that P has a normal distribution with
mean ct and variance a2.
The consumer's budget constraint in the first period is




• (1-d)RJz Housing expenditures if renter
-
dh((l-O)P1+P1((8r+r)(l-m)÷ 8]) Out-of-pocket housing
expenditures if owner
-
A1 Financial assets purchased
Line four of (2), out-of-pocket housingexpenditures, is composed of the down payment
(1-O)Ph, mortgage interest rOP1h,property taxes 'rP1h, maintenance/depreciation 8P1h,
and an offset m(r8+t)Ph arising from thedeductability of mortgage interest and
property taxes from income subject to income taxes. Using the definition oft,line
four can be written compactly as
-dhP2(1-O+1.t).Thesecond period budget constraint is









For simplicity, we assume that fi.nancial assets are held as savings accounts (resp.,
consumer loans) that carry the mortgage interest rate r, and that interest income
(resp., expense) is taxed (resp., deducted) at the marginal rate m. Then, the first
line of (3) gives financial assets in the second period after taxes. The second line of
(3) gives the cash received from sale of a house in period 2, less repayment of mortgage
principal, (1)2 -0P1)hand taxes on nominal capital gains m(P2 -P1)h,which are assumed
to be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. Using the definitions of r' and 1),
this constraint can be written compactly as 0 =(14-r')A1+ dhP1(l-O+(1-m)P] -
W2.
Combining (2) and (3) to eliminate A1 gives an intertemporal budget constraint,
(4) W2 =dhP1[l-e+( 1 -m)P] + (l+r' ]( W1+(l-m)Y1-it1g-( l-d)Rh-dhP1( l-O+ii))
=(li-r')(W1+( l-m)Y1-it1g-(l-d)Rh] -dhP1[(1+r' )p.+r' (l-O)-( l-m)P]










c =(l+r')I.L+ r'(l-O) (1-m)a (1-m)(r+t) + 8 -(I-m)cx
Then, w is total initial wealth, q is a risk penalty associated with the uncertainty
5about future house prices, and cisthe expecteduser cost of housing per dollar
purchased. Thelast form of cis obtainedusing the approximation r' .t0. The ru-st.




(7)VhU = .[(1+r')R(l-d)+ dP1c+dhPq]i,
where
C'ex - - (l+r')1g-(l-(1+r')Rh-
dhP1c- h2]
Aconsumer whose utility Udoesnot depend on tenure dwillchoose to own if
P1c'<R, where c'= c +P1hq/2, and rent otherwise. If all consumers are identical,
then equilibrium in a market in which both purchased andrental housing appear requires
that prices and rents adjust so that R =P'c'.On the other hand, if there is a
distribution of beliefs, or even a distribution of wealthand income that induces a
distribution of c',thenthe split between owning and renting will be determinedby the
proportion of consumers with c'satisfyingP1c' < R. with R and P1 adjusting to clear
the purchase and rental markets. Ofcourse, if there is a distribution of tastes for
tenure entering U, or of degrees of risk aversionic, this will split the population
between owners and renters even if all consumers havecommon beliefs.
The marginal utility of additional housing ispositive.Then when faced with
negative c,correspondingto a high rate of positive capital gains, theconsumer will
choose d =1and a high level of h, financing the purchaseby borrowing financial assets
at the after-tax rate (1-m)r.Risk aversion will, however, keep h
-2cfP1q.The
market will respond to this increase in the demand forpurchases by increasing P1. This
arbitrage opportunity implies that very large anticipatedcapital gains over very short
periods will be squeezed out by the market.Similarly, large anticipated capital losses
should induce a shift to rental housing which lowersP1 and squeezes out some of the
capital losses.In practice, consumers are additionally constrained withrespect to the
6proportion of a housing purchase they can mortgage, and with respect to fmancing down
payments with borrowed money, and there are substantial transactions costs associated
with moves between rental and owner housing, or in changing housing consumption levels
in owner-occupied housing.These will further limit the scope for arbitrage by
consumers, and leave the possibility of modest anticipated capital gains and losses that
are not arbitraged away. From the last form of the definition of c, the user cost of
housing does not depend on equity versus debt fmancing (0), a consumer equivalent of
the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
A comparative statics analysis of the impact of income and prices on consumer
decisions can be carried out given the assumptions below equation (1), plus the
following assumptions:
(v) The elasticities of g and h with respect to o are less than one:
(vi) The elasticity of h with respect to R (for renters) or P1 (for owners) is less
than one in magnitude.
(vii) The elasticity of ubstitution between g and h is at most one.
(viii) The degree of relative risk aversion is less than two.
The directions of change expected under assumptions (i)-(viii) is summarized in
Table 1. The impact of P1 in this table does not take into account indirect effects
arising because P1 effects consumer beliefs about capital gains.The first row of the
table is constructed under the assumption that across consumers there is a continuous
distribution of beliefs about capital gains rates, and this distributiondivides the
population into owners and renters. The expected capital gains rate Ctisreinterpreted
as characterizing the location of this distribution.Details of the construction of the
table are given in an appendix.
Define the ex ante expected savings rate of the consumer to be I =(W-
W1)1Y1,
and the ex post realizedsavingsrate to be s =(W2-W1)1Y1 I+(l-m)dhP1(P
-
cx)1Y1.
From Table 1, the ex antesavingsrate should fall when P1 rises and rise when a rises,
other things being equal.This effect can be reversed if consumers believe that a is
higher when P1 is higher. Define i.= (1-m)dhP1fY1and let & =
Ej,
.P denote the
statistical expectation of 1',giveninitial information.Then s =I+i(P-a),
7implying that Ej,1 9.s = s' +'/(ct'-a)and s -
E1,1s = y(P -a'). Inthe population,
the ex post savings rate satisfies
(8) cov(s,P1) = +iy(a' - a))(P1-E5P1)
= EI(P1-EfP1) +E9.'w(a'-
(9) cov(s,P) = E,5,.(s'+ y(P-a')+y(a'-a))(P-a'+a'-Ext)
= Ei(a' - + EyW.Vard'lY)+Ei(a'-a)(at -
Ifconsumer expectations Ctdonot depend on P1 and rational expectations a' are
uncorrelated with P1, then the first term in (8) should be negative from Table 1 andthe
second term should be zero, so that cov(s,P) <0.If consumer expectations a are
positively correlated with P1, then the first term in (8) can be positive; the second
term will reinforce this if rational expectations are more positively correlated with
P1 than beliefs, and offset this otherwise.The first term in (9) is non-negative from
Table 1, provided consumer expectations arenon-negatively correlated with rational
expectations. The second term is positive. The third term is zero ifexpectations are
rational, and positive if consumer beliefs exhibit "regression to themean", positively
correlated with rational expectations but with smaller deviations from themean. If the
correlation of P andis low, then the slope coefficients in a regression ofs on one,
and P will have the signs of cov(s,P) and cov(s,P),respectively. The magnitude of
the coefficient of f'willbe relatively small if capital gains are largelyanticipated,
so that the conditional variance ofis small, and the "bias" a -a'has a low
correlation with a'.If consumers are naive in forming expectations,believing that P
is more positively correlated withP1 than is the case, this will make the coefficient
of P1 less positive, and have relatively little effecton the coefficient of P.
We have argued that arbitrage byconsumers, achieved by varying the level of
housing consumption and by moving between rental and ownerhousing, should limit but not
eliminate anticipated capital gains.The behavior of supply will also effect the
transmission of demographic trends into housingprices. Poterba (1984), Topel and Rosen
8(1988), and McFadden (1993b) have found aggregate supply of new housing to be quite
price-elastic, with elasticities around 2.Real housing investment has averaged 5.3
percentof real constant-quality stocks over the period 1900-1990, the elasticity of
stocks with respect to price is quite low, about 0.11. Then, one would expect short-run
changes in housing demand to induce substantial short-run variations in housing prices.
However, developers do have some control on the timing of completion and marketing of
new houses, giving them some arbitrage opportunities when there are large anticipated
capital gains or losses.
We conclude from this analysis that rational consumers should display behavioral
response to anticipated capital gains, although arbitrage will limit the magnitude of
these gains.If consumers expect no correlation between initial information and future
price changes, so there are no anticipated capital gains, then comparative statics
suggests that ex post savings rates are likely to be negatively correlated with initial
housing prices, and correlated dollar-for-dollar with er post realized capital gains.
On the other hand, it arbitrage does not eliminate anticipated capital gains, and these
are forecastable in part from initial housing prices and other information, then ex post
savings can be positively correlated with initial house prices.Further, there may be
some behavioral offset to the savings these capital gains are expected to generate.
B. Demographics and Housing Consumption. An empirical examination of demographics
and housing consumption can be made using U.S. Census Public Use samples of 0.1 percent
of the population, which give household size and age composition, status as a renter or
owner, and owner-reported dwelling value. McFadden (l993b) analyzes the 1940, 1960,
1970, and 1980 Census samples, adapting a model suggested by Mankiw and Well (1989):
(10) Vh =aK
+
whereh indexes households, t indexes year, j= 0,...,Jindexes five-year age cohorts,
is stated dwelling value, is the number of persons in cohort jinhousehold h,
a, is the imputed housing consumption of individuals in cohort jinyear t, and is
a disturbance. This model applies to homeowners. To correct for bias due toself-
selection between owning and renting, a probit model is first estimated for tenure
9choice, using observations on both owners and renters:
(11) Pr(Owner) =((;++ ;y
where y is real household income. Then, an inverse Mills ratio is calculatedfrom
this probic equation, and added to (10) to absorb the non-zero conditionalexpectation
of induced by selection.Figure 1, adapted from McFadden (1993b), plots the
coefficients from the selection-adjusted regressions, relative to theage 40-44 cohort,
for each Census year. These profiles are remarkably stable between 1960 and1980. The
profile for 1940 shows less relative housing consumption for the cohorts between 25 and
39 than is observed in the later Censuses. This is almostcertainly attributable to the
lack of consumer confidence and shortage of liquidity during the GreatDepression, when
these cohorts might normally have been rapidly increasing theirhousing consumption.
This figure provides empirical justification for anassumption that the relative housing
consumption profile will remain stable in the future.Figure 2 gives the 1970 profile.
which will be used for further Computation, with 95percent confidence bounds. The
profile is quite precisely determined except for thevery old, where sample sizes are
small.
McFadden (1993b) summarizes U.S. Census data onpopulation by sex and five-year age
cohort in Census years from 1900 through 1990,using Current Population Reports, and
contemporaneous life tables to interpolate in the early part of thecentury. He then
uses the cohort-component projection procedure, combined with 1989U.S. Census "mid-
range" assumptions on fertility, mortality, and immigration, toproject population by
age-cohort in the coming century.Figure 3 shows historical and projected population,
and houing.consumption..equjvainr population in whicheach age cohort is scaled to its
equivalent numbers of age 40-44persons, using the coefficients from Figure 2.
Qualitatively, the equivalent population curve shows relativelysteady growth from the
beginning of the century until about 1975, rises more rapidly from 1975to 1990 as the
post-World-War U "baby boomers" formed households andacquired houses, and is forecast
to rise much more slowly after 1990, becomingessentially flat after 2020.
Equivalent population has a correlation of 0.964 with realconstant-quality housing
stock over the period 1900.1990, anda correlation of 0.904 with housing prices measured
by the ON? Implicit price Deflator. Further evidenceon the correlation of changes in
10equivalent population andhousingprices is obtained by examining 112 Met.ropolitian
Statistical Areas (MSA) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) during the
decade of the 1980's. We use American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association data
on prices of "standard 3 bedroom, 2 bath one-family houses suitable for a mid-management
level owner"; ACCRA (1992).These data are obtained from quarterly surveys of
homebuilders, mortgage bankers, appraisers, and savings and loan officers. Respondents
were askedforsales prices of new homes meeting the criteria above and an additional
list of detailed specifications.If no new homes meeting the specifications were
marketed, then recent resale homes were asked for. A drawback of these prices is that
they are not representative of the total housing market, and may not be accurate for low
income consumers.Missing quarters are imputed by interpolation.In some cases,
missing observations in are imputed by the following method: The National Association
of Realtors Home is and Home Yearbook provide data on median sales prices of
resale one-family homes by year and MSA (National Association of Realtors, 1990). For
all MSA where both the American Chamber of Commerce and American Realtors series are
available, we form the ratio of their (unweighted) means in each year. Then, we deflate
the American Realtors series using these ratios, and use this deflated series to fill in
missing observations in the American Chamber of Commerce series. The effect of the
deflation is to remove quality changes in the Realtors series that are held constant in
the Chamber of Commerce series. The final extended Chamber of Commerce series is then
in nominal dollars, and is substantially but not completely adjusted to remove quality
changes. The housing price data shows substantial variation across MSA's. Figure 4
shows the distribution of rates of price changes, deflated by the CPI, from 1984 to
1989; the observations on which this distribution is based are weighted by MSA
population.Some perspective on the consistency of these prices is provided by
comparing them with median house values in the MSA's in census years. There is a
mismatch in years (1984-89 for ACCRAI 1980-90 for Census), with some significant
macroeconomic changes in the non-overlapping period. Also, the Census values are not
quality-adjusted.Figure 5showsa scatter plot of the two price series, along with a
fit of Census price changes to ACCRA price changes. There is considerable scatter, and
a few MSA's such as Peoria, Grand Rapids, York, and Lancaster are outliers.
Nevertheless, the correlation of the two variables is 0.56.
Equivalentpopulation for each MSA is approximated by applying the cohort size
weighted average coefficients from Figure 2 to the population age segments 0-18, 19-64,
11and 65+.For1970, these age distributions were not available by MSA, so that the
corresponding age distribution in the state containing the MSA was used. Changes in
equivalent population are quite forecastable in the short run, even at the MSA level. A
regression of the rate of equivalent population change 1980-90 on the rate of equivalent
population change 1970-80, plus a constant and the rate of change of real median prices
in 1970-80, gives a multiple correlation coefficient of 0.407, with the lagged
equivalent population change providing most of the explanatory power. The correlation
of 1970-80 equivalent population change and 1980-90 equivalent population change is
0.6 18.
Figure 6 gives the scatter plot for the rates of change in real housing prices over





Our comparative statics analysis suggests that price changes and population changes
should be positively correlated in the market, even when the population change is fully
anticipated.Unanticipated changes in population should have a stronger positive
impact, since they will not have increased initial prices via reduced user cost which
increases initial demand. However, the regression does not show the expected positive
correlation between housing price change and equivalent population change, andsuggests
instead that population changes are fully anticipated and actively arbitragedaway.
However, there are also several econometric reasons the regression might fail to exhibit
the expected effects, including variations in income growth or economic conditions
across MSAS that are omitted from the model, speculative Hbubbles in prices that
increase variance and produce outliers, or measurement problems related to the
definition of MSA boundaries and the distribution of home sales within each MSA. In
addition, there may be self-selection between homeowners and renters that is related to
population growth, and there may be endogeneity of population growth, which may respond
to price differentials.Examination of the scatter plot suggests that there are
outliers. However, a Least Absolute Deviations regression that reduces the influence of
outliers does not change the coefficients substantially.
Extending this analysis, we ask whether housing price changes are predictable from
12initial information on housing price levels (which may be correlates of past population
growth) and the rate of change in population growth. The regression
Price




has R1 =0.108,indicating that the initial information embodied in historical housing
prices and current population growth has little predicitive power, but that past
population growth does have some predictive power.
A second implication of the housing market model is that as a result of arbitrage
the level of housing prices should be higher in markets where population growth is
higher. To test this, we regress 1984 price on the rates of population change 1970-80
and 1980-90, and on the 1970-80 rate of housing price change:
Equiv. Popul Equiv. Popul





This regression indicates that Initial price is positively related to future population
growth, but not related to past rates of price change or population growth.This
suggests that demographic effects are largely translated by arbitrage intoinitial
prices, and consumers are primarily affected through these price changes rather than
through capital gains.
13
(0.183)Sharper, and somewhat different, results are obtained when the rate of growth of
median house values, as reported by Census, is used instead of the ACCRA measure:
Median Price
(15) Log Median Price 1.042 +O.893'Log +
O.018'Log(Price80)
(1.076)(0.282) (0.105)
Median Price -1.116• -0.53lLog MedianPrice
(0.264) (0.111)
This regression has R2 =0.35,suggesting that real housing price changes are
forecastable.Contemporaneous population growth has predictive power and is positively
correlated with price changes.The effect of lagged price change is negative,
suggesting that the market overshoots.Measurement error in Census data should be
modest, but if present could also explain the last effect.The negative sign on past
population growth rates also suggests a market cycle, with "spurts" of past population
growth that are uncorrelated with current population growth possibly leading to
"overbuilding" which creates downward pressure on market prices.
Since there is moderately good agreement between the ACCRA and Census prices, it is
surprising that the regressions (13) and (15) are substantially different.In further
analysis, we will use the ACCRA prices, which match the dates of the savings data to be
analyzed.For the critical question of behavioral response in savings, we willrepeat
the analysis using the apparently more forecastable Census prices.
The pattern of results for MSA's with Census median house prices is confirmed byan
analysis of changes in population and housing prices across states. We use the median
of owner-reported dwelling values by state, not quality-adjusted, from the 1970, 1980,
and 1990 U.S. Censuses. We use state equivalent population, constructed in thesame way
as the MSA equivalent populations. The regressions analogous to (14) and (15) are
14Equiv. Popu1 Equiv. Popul













Equation(16)has R2 =0.336.Initial prices appear to be related to future population
growth. indicating that arbitrage occurs. The terms involving equivalent population can
be rearranged into the form
0.769• Log (: ;::J +1.080•
fLoe(:::J -
Then,initial price is positively related to the rate of change of future population and
to the rate of acceleration of equivalent population.
Equation (17) has R2 =0.581, so that housing price changes appear to be
forecastable, with current and lagged equivalent population growth, and lagged price
changes all significant. The directions of the effects are the same as were found in
the MSA data. Again, the effects of equivalent population changes can be reinterpreted
15as positive response to contemporaneous equivalent population growth (with a coefficient
of 0.393) and to the rate of acceleration of equivalent population (with a coefficient
of 1.187).
The analysis above with ACCRA prices suggests that demographic effects are largely
anticipated and arbitraged away in the housing market, so that initial prices embody
current information about forecastable trends.Because there are essentiaily no
surprises in population growth over a decade, even at the MSA level, there is no
significant correlation of ex post population change and er post price change. However,
using Census prices, there appears to be evidence for a substantial forecastable
component in housing prices. We have indicated several possible sources of differences
in the two price series, but have not identified any key features that would lead to the
differences in fitted regressions using the two different sources.If the market is not
perfectly efficient and there is substantial forecastability, then there is at least
scope for a behavioral response that would mitigate some of the adverse effects of
demographic changes that are expected to weaken the housing market and reduce real
capital gains.
Over the forty year horizon facing a 30-year-old prospective home buyer, birth
races and consequent changes in equivalent population are not so highly forecastable,
and one would expect to see a significant positive correlation of expost population
changes and ex post price changes. These conclusions have several implications for
life.cycle savings behavior.First, if arbitrage eliminates most forecastable capital
gains, then there is little room for demographics to influence savings behaviorexcept
via its impact on initial prices.In the long run, the demographic effects may contain
innovations that will result in ex post capital gains, but since theseare not
forecastable, they cannot alter savings behavior. Then, most demographic change should
have relatively little ex ante impact on behavior, with theconsequence that the effects
of demographics on market prices should translate directly into changes in welfare,
particularly as a result of unanticipated changes late in life.
16EU. WEALTH, EXPECTATIONS AND SAVINGS
A. Background. In this section we explore the role of expost measures of capital gains
in the housing marke on household savings decisions. Equity in housing has traditionally
represented a major component of household wealth in the United States. Feinstein and
McFadden (1989), Venti and Wise (1990), and McFadden (1993a) have found that housing
equity represents more than fifty percent of total wealth in the population over age 65.Housing
wealth has increased with age, at least in the past decade, except for the very old, but extraction
of equity becomes an important resource after age 75.Thetrend of rising house prices that has
typified the U.S. market for past decades, as noted by McFadden (1993b), has translated into
increases in wealth for current cohorts of elderly homeowners. However, Mankiw and Weil
(1989) and McFadden (1993b) have argued that population aging in the U.S. in the coming three
decades is likely to result in a reversal of these trends in housing prices. McFadden (1993b)
finds that a potential implication of this reversal is capital losses accompanied by non-trivial
welfare losses for younger cohorts of current homeowners. However, if households can
anticipate changes in housing prices, and if they adjust their non-housing savings accordingly,
then welfare losses in retirement could be mitigated. The empirical question that we examine
in this section is how household savings decisions are affected by capital gains in housing.
Section Ii presented a simple two-period model of consumption and savings. An
implication of that model is that consumers should show some savings behavior response to the
level of housing prices, essentially because housing demand is inelastic, housing consumption
cannot be reduced sufficiently to reduce equity, and compensating adjustments in financial
savings are not fully offsetting. Another implication is that ex ante savings rates should respond
positively to a change in beliefs that increases expected capital gains. Ex post savings rates,
which incorporate realized capital gains, will reflect this dependence in addition to the
dependence built into the accounting. However, if capital gains cannot be forecast from current
information, including demographic trends, then only the accounting dependence will be
observed. The results in Section 2 suggest that this may indeed be the case. This should be seen
most clearly by examining the rate of savings for assets other than housing equity. Of course,
if consumers are irrational in their beliefs, and fail to use available information, then a
behavioral response may be absent even if capital gains are in principle forecasiable.
17Recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics provides an excellent datasource
for the analysis of savings among elderly households. Comprehensive dataon housing and non-
housing wealth is collected in 1984 and 1989 for over seven thousand households. Weuse this
wealth data to form measures of real savings rates over the fiveyear period. Data on average
housing prices by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) are used to formexpost real capital gain
races over the 1984-1989 period which are then matched to each household in the PSIDbased
on their county of residence. If consumers can predict changes in housingprices theyhave
full behavioral offset in savings, then we wouldexpect to see very low correlation between
changes in area housing prices and savings races. However, if individualsare naive in forming
expectations, or they do not adjust savings, then we wouldexpect to see a positive correlation
between ex post savings races and cx post capital gains inhousing, as suggested by (8) and (9)
derived from the two-period model.
The MSA level regression results in Section 2present somewhat mixed evidence
concerning the degree to which capital gains in housing are forecastable basedon current
information, including demographics. In view of these results, the householdlevel savings
regressions in this section use both sources of housing price data, thosefrom ACCRA and
CENSUS.
We present estimates of the effect of changes inhousing prices on total, housing and non-
housing savings rates.These regressions Contain controls forage of head, health status,
demographic characteristics such as marital status,race, education and sex of head, as well as
income and initial wealth.
B. Data and Definitions. The data used forour analysis of the determinants of
household savings are drawn from the PanelStudy of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is
a longitudinal dacasec collected by the Institute for SocialResearch (ISR) at the University of
Michigan which began in 1968 with a sample of about5,000 households containing 18,000
individuals. All members (and descendants) ofthese original survey families have been re-
interviewed annually such that by thetwenty second year of the panel, more than 38,000
individuals have participated or arecurrently participating in the survey. All estimates presented
here are based on the 1968-1989 (or WaveXXII) sample of the PSID.
18The PSIDcontainsa detailed accountingof wealth for all survey householdsin1984and
1989. Using this data, we construct measures of net worth in 1984 and 1989 that include home
equity (house value less remaining principal), other real estate equity, financial assets (savings
accounts, money market accounts, CDs, treasury bills, mutual funds, stocks, and bonds),
business equity, and vehicle equity, less household debt. In an assessment of quality of wealth
estimates from survey data, Curtin et al. (1989) find that the PSID provides wealth data which
is 'of surprisingly high quality, relative to the quality obtainable with much more intensive
survey methods and higher costs per case.N(p.477) In addition to the wealth data, the PSID
contains data on health status, demographic variables, family composition, household income,
and state and county of residence. The demographic data used in this analysis includes age,
education, marital status, sex and race of the head of household.
We limit the sample to include those households which have stable family compositions
over the 1984 to 1989 period. Primarily, we seek to exclude those families where there has been
a divorce, marriage, or remarriage during the five year period. We choose to limit our analysis
to these intact households because major changes in family composition, such as marriages or
divorces, could have a large impact on the savings rate over this period which is not necessarily
attributable to life-cycle savings behavior. There are a total of 7,114 households in the 1989
sample of the PSID, ofwhich4,719 satisfy our definition of an intact family. We further limit
the sample by excluding families where the head of household is less than 30 and dropping
observations with missing data on demographic variables, resulting in a sample with 4,360
observations.2
The PSID data are augmented with data on changes in housing prices by metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) from two different sources. The first source comes from the American
2Our sample selection is designed to identify those households where there was no change in the head
or wife over the five year period. The one exception is that we include those households where the bead
or wife died between 1984 and 1989 but the surviving spouse has not remarried. Those households with
no change in the head or spouse represent almost 98 percent of the observations in our dataset. Overall,
in the PSED, over seventy percent of the households In the 1989 sample have no change in the head or
spouse between 1984 and 1989. We do not limit the sample to owners because one of the implications
of the model in section 2 Is that it may be optimal to change ownership status in response to anticipated
capital gains or losses.
19Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association and covers the period 1984-1989 and the second
source is the Decennial Census and covers the years 198O-1990. The ACCRA data is attractive
because it measures quality constant housing price for the same period that the PSID savings rate
is measured. The Census data represents owner reported house value. Both sources of data are
available at the MSAorprimary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) level. Because the PSID
identifies county of residence not MSA, we merge the housing price data with the PSID data
using a Department of Census file which maps counties into MSAs. About 27 percent of the
households in our sample live in counties that are not part of one of the 112 PMSAs or MSAs
represented in the Chamber of Commerce Data. In addition, price data was not available for
the entire 1984-1989 period for all of the MSAs. The resulting number of observations with data
on area housing prices from ACCRA is 2,427. Capital gains from housing are measured by
the log of the ratio of real housing prices in over the period.
The dependent variable in the regressions is real savings rate over the five year period,
1984 to 1989. The savings rate is defined as the difference in real wealth in 1989 and real





Inorder to explore the effect of capital gains in housing on savings, we split total savings into
its housingandnon-housingcomponents.Wealth in each of the years can be easily separated
into equity in housing and all non-housing wealth. Housing wealth includes equity in the home
3Both sources of housing price data are described in more detail in section II.B, above.
4We are able to assign housing price data to 2,694 of the 4,360 observations in the intact sample.
The sample is reduced further to 2,427 observations by dropping those households who move out of
county during the 5 year period 1984-1989.
5The wealth data correspond to the years 1984 and 1989. To create the savings rate, we divide by
total (real) income received in the period between the wealth assessments. This corresponds to income
received in 1984-1988. In the PSID, income received in calendar year : is provided in survey year t+1.
Therefore,total income is the real sum of income from calendar years 1984-1988, or survey years 1985-
1989.
20and all other real estate equity while non-housing wealth includes financial assets (liquid assets,
stocks, and bonds), business equity, and vehicle equity, less household debt. Using these wealth
measures, the total savings rate over the period is separated into housing savings and non-housing
savings rates.
Summary statistics forthesample of all intact families from the PSID are provided in
Table 2. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sub-sample with housing price data. In
order to minimize the impact of outliers in savings rates, we drop observations in the top and
bottom 2.5 percent of the total savings rate distribution.6 The final sample sizes are 4,142 for
all intact families, and 2,331 for the sample of intact households with area housing price data.7
Table 2 shows that mean wealth (in 1989 dollars) increased from $72,647 in 1984 to $95,707
in 1989. The real savings rate averaged 7.3 percent, about equally split between housing and
non-housing savings. The average age of the head of household in 1989 was 49, and over 1,180
families had a head over the age of 60. The health status variable is self-reported health status
of the head in 1984. The values range from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very poor). Over half of the
sample reports health to be excellent or very good. Sixty-three percent of the households are
married couple households and about 72 percent are headed by men. The sample of households
in MSAs have slightly higher wealth, savings rates, and income. They are older, and more
likely to be single, black and headed by a female. Average housing prices (in 1989 dollars)
increased from $1 14,000 in 1984 to $130,952 in 1989, representing a increase of 9.2 percent.
Figure 4 shows that there is large variation in the housing growth rate over this period. Over
50 percent of the sample had real growth between 10 and 50 percent while about a third of the
sample had capital losses.
C.Life Cycle Savingsand Wealth. The F'SID data show large differences in the level
6Trimming the data in this waydrops observationswithsavingsratesof lessthan -118percentor
more than 133percent. There seem tobeafew extremeoutliers in the datasuchas a savings rate of over
10,000 percent and theestimatesare sensitive tothe exclusionoftheseoutliers. Other than dropping
these extreme outliers, the results are not sensitive to the amount of trimming of the data.
7Note that these sample counts are for the Chamber of Commerce housing price data. The sample
sizes are somewhat smaller for the Census housing price data because of data availability.
21and composition of wealth and savings by age of head of household. Figure 7 provides estimates
for mean wealth in 1989 by age of head of household and Figure 8 plots median wealth by age
of head of household.5 Mean wealth rises steeply from age 30-34 to age 60-64, an increase
from $34,000 to $160,000. Wealth falls to about $100,000 for ages 75 and over. Median
wealth also follows this hump shaped pattern, but due to the highly skewed nature to wealth, the
levels are consistently lower. Median wealth rises from $13,020 for households with heads age
30-34 to $70,000 for those age 60-64, then falling to about $40,000-$50,000 for those age 70
and over.9
These figures also plot the housing and non-housing components of household wealth.
The humped shaped pattern for wealth is particularly apparent for housing wealth, but it not
apparent for non-housing wealth. Median housing wealth falls from $40,000 among those aged
55-64 to $20,000 for those 80 and over. At the same time, median non-housing wealth remains
fairly constant over this age range.
Housing wealth represents the single most important part of total household wealth among
families in the United States. Among our sample of intact families in the PSID data, housing
wealth represents, on average, over half of total wealth. As shown in Figure 9, the relative
importance of housing wealth varies dramatically over the life cycle. Among younger families
home ownership is low, housing wealth peaks as a percent of total wealth atage 60-64, and then
decreases. Housing wealth as a percent of total wealth increases from about 35percent among
the youngest cohort to a high of over 55 percent for thoseage 60-64, then falling to about 40
percent of total wealth for those in the oldest cohorts.
Figure 10 summarizes the life-cycle pattern of total, housing and non-housing savings
rates over the period 1984 to 1989. Between the ages of 35 and 60, the total savings rate
8Means by five year age class are fairly precisely estimated due to cell sizesaveraging between 200-
350. The exception is the oldest age group (85+) which is imprecisely estimated due to asample size
of 47.
9Because we are only using oneyear of wealth data, these age effects of wealth could also be
generated by cohort effects. That is, those age 80-84 in the data also belong to the same birth cohort.
These data do not allow for the separate identification of age effects and cohort effects. Foran analySiS
of financial wealth holdings by age and birth cohort see Atxanasio (1992).
22averages about nine percent of real income over the 5 year period. After age 60, the savings
rate decreases to about 5 percent and eventually turns negative only at the highest age levels.
I-lousing savings follows this same pattern, with lower savings rates among (he elderly. Non-
housing savings, however, remains more steady over the life cycle.
D. Savings Ratesand Capital Gains inHousing. This section investigates the effect
of changes in housing prices on five year savings rates using a sample of intact families from the
PSID. As described above, the savings rate data correspond to the period 1984 to 1989. The
housing price data refer to price changes for the MSA that the family resides in. The Chamber
of Commerce housing price data covers the years 1984-1989 while the Census data covers the
years 1980-1990.
Table 4a presents parameter estimates for regressions where the dependent variable is the
total savings rate.1° Model (1) relates savings rates to age of head of household. As shown
earlier in the savings rate profiles presented in Figure 12, these estimates imply a hump shaped
savings rate with the downturn in savings rates beginning at about age 45. Model (2) considers
a larger set of demographic variables. Savings rates are found to be higher for married couples,
and those families whose head of household is non-black or male. However, neither sex nor
race of head of household are found to significantly affect savings rates. Higher education levels
(education of the head) are associated with higher rates of savings. Self-reported health of the
head in 1984 is associated with lower levels of savings. This is consistent with the evidence in
Attanasio and Hoynes (1993) where lower levels of household wealth are associated with higher
levels of mortality risk. Controlling for these demographic variables shifts out the age profile
for savings rates. The parameter estimates in model (2) imply that savings rates are maximized
at age 56, and decline after.
The next three models add capital gains in housing prices for the MSA of residence to
t0For each of the models reported in this section, the dependent variable is the savings rate multiplied
by100.
23the savings race regression.1' These housing price data correspond to 1984-1989 and are from
the Chamber of Commerce (ACCRA). The housing price variable is constructed as log of the
ratio of real housing prices in 1989 to real housing prices in 1984. These estimates in Model
(3) imply that an increase in the growth race of real housing prices of ten percentage points will
lead, on average, to an increase in the total savings rate of 2.28 percentage points, or an increase
of 37 percent. What does this suggest for the amount of behavioral offset that householdsare
engaging in? At mean levels of income and wealth, an additional real increase of 10percentage
points in home value (with no offsetting change in savings) will lead to an increase in the savings
rate of 3. 10 percentage points. If individuals are, in fact, forming correct expectations about
changes in housing prices, then these estimates suggest that they are making (at the most)very
minor changes to their non-housing savings.
This result can also be seen by considering the effect of capital gains inhousing on
housing and non-housing savings rates. Parameter estimates for the housing savings rate
regressions are presented in Table 5a while the non-housing savings rate estimates are in Table
6a)2 Consider the estimates for model (3) in Tables 5a and 6a.The effect of changes in area
housing prices has the same effect on the housing savings rate as was found for the totalsavings
rate. For non-housing savings, capital gains in housing is associated with both small and
statistically insignificant changes in non-housing savings.
The model presented in section II suggests that savings rates should becorrelated with
the initial level of housing prices, as well as the growth rate. Model(4) adds the log of the 1984
11Note that the sample size is reduced by half whenwe include the MSA level housing price data in
the specification. As described in section 111.8., this is because ofincomplete price data and because
about a quarter of the PSID sample does not live in an MSA. Estimatesnot reported here suggest that
there are not large differences in the role of demographic variablesamong these two samples. Because
of the smaller sample, however, the precision of the estimatesgenerally is reduced.
The effects of demographic variableson housing and non-housing savings rates are similar to the
results summarized for the total savings rate equation. Notable differencesarc that health status in 1984
is more important in determining changes innon-housing as compared to housing wealth. If poor health
leads to low savings rates because of an increase in medicalcosts, reductions in non-housing wealth would
be expected due to the highly illiquid nature ofhousing wealth. In addition, housing savings is found to
peak at an earlier age compared to total savings razes. Model (2)implies that housing savings rates begin
to decline at age 49, compared to age 56 for total savings.
24housing price to the regressions. Increasesin initial housing prices are associated with increases
in the totaland housing savings rates but have no significant effect on non-housing savings. A
tenpercent increase in initial housingpricesincreases the (total) savings rate by 1.4 percentage
points, an increase of about 17 percent. Finally, model (5) includes past measures of population
and price changes for the MSA. Neither of these variables affect household savings.
The savings regressions presented above assume that the behavioral response to a given
change in capital gains is constant across all households. Because older homeowners are closer
to retirement and possibly more likely to be considering selling their home in the near future than
younger homeowners, it is possible that the behavioral response would differ with the age of the
household head. Model (6) interacts the change in housing prices with dummies for age of the
household head. Our results show no significant differences in the responses of households with
heads less than 40, between 40 and 60, and over 60.
Further, we find that adding controls for household wealth and income does not change
the conclusions about the role of capital gains in housing. Models (7) and (8) in tables 4a-6a
show that higher household income and lower initial wealth are associated with higher savings
rates. The results for wealth, however, appear to be spurious:Initial housing wealth is
significantly negatively correlated with housing savings while initial non-housing wealth is
significantly negatively correlated with non-housing savings rates.
These savings regressions imply that households are not engaging in any behavioral offset
in response to changes in housing prices. However, if capital gains cannot be forecast from
current information, then we would not expect to see the households engaging in any offsetting
behavior. The results in Section 2 suggest that, using the ACCRA data, housing prices are not
forecast.able from current information, including demographics. However, the Census data
implies that these gains are not arbitraged away and housing prices are foreca.stable from
demographics. Tables 4b, Sb, and 6b present estimates for models which use the Census price
data to reconsider the issue of behavioral offset.
Model (1) in tables 4b-6b includes the full set of demographic variables and the growth
t3We considered several specifications for the interaction between age and price change (e.g.various
other dummy variable interactions, age polynomial) and in each case there were no significant age effects.
25race inhousing prices from 1980-1990. The housing price variable is constructed as log of the
ratio of real housing prices in 1990 to real housing prices in 1980. Results using the Censusdata
havethe same implications about offsetting behavior as we found with the ACCRA housing price
data. Increases in capital gains in housing have a large and positive effect on both total and
housing savings. The results in Table 6b, however, show that there is no effect of changes in
capital gains in housing prices on non-housing savings. These results are robust to the addition
of 1980 housing price (model (2)) as well as measures of pa.st growth in population and housing
prices (model (3)).
If households can perfectly predict capital gains in housing theyoffset this change
by fully adjusting non-housing savings rates, then we would expect to see zero correlation
between changes in housing prices and total savings rates, and negative correlation between
changes in housing prices and non-housing savings rates. We find neither. There are several
hypotheses, however, that are consistent with our findings. Expectations about capital gains in
housing prices may not play any role in savings decisions. That is, even if consumers had
perfect foresight about changes in housing prices, they do not change their savings rates tocry
to achieve some target total savings over the period. Alternatively, expectations play a role but
households are "naive" in forming these expectations. That is, theymay not be using all of the
available information (e.g. forecastable components of housing price changes suchas
demographic trends) to form expectations about changes in housing prices.
IV. CONCLUNGREMu
Housing equity represents an important part of household wealth in the United States.
Steady gains in housing prices over the last several decades have generated large potential gains
in household wealth among homeowners. Mankiw and Weil (1989) and McFadden(1993b) have
argued the population aging in the U.S. is likely to induce substantial declines in housingprices,
resulting in capital losses for future elderly generations. However, it' households are able to
anticipate these housing price changes, and they modify their non-housing savings decisions, then
potential losses may be mitigated.
We use data on housing prices and demographic trends for 112metropolitan statistical
areas (MSA) to investigate whether housing prices are forecastable from current information.
26We then estimate housing savings raCe equations using data on five year savings rates from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We use data from two different sources to examine the effect
of demographics on housing prices and in future research we intend to use alternative data
sources to further examine this important issue.
While our results are mixed with respect to the forecastability of housing prices, we found
no evidence that households were changing their non-housing savings in response to expectations
about capital gains in housing. This could result in large welfare losses to current homeowners
and large intergenerational equity differences.
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FullSampleof Intact Households, 1984-1989 1
Mean Standard
DeviationMedian MinimumMaximum
Total Wealth, 1984 a 72647 174684 27569 -216200 5752500
Housing Wealth, 1984 39081 78008 16708 -28046 2252400
Non-Housing Wealth, 1984 33565 130267 7208 -273960 5633100
Total Wealth, 1989 95707 235097 36675 -107400 7460000
Housing Wealth, 1989 50572 94727 21500 -100000 2270000
Non-Housing Wealth, 1989 45135 182374 9500 -126800 6675000
Total Savings Rate 84-89 0.073 0.321 0.027 -1.147 1.326
Housing Savings Race 84-89 0.039 0.255 0.000 -2.326 2.228
Non-Housing Savings Rate 84-89 0.034 0.244 0.008 -1.873 1.946
Real Income 1984-1989 174533 166017 143110 2657 4251000
Age 47.8 15.3 46 30 97






Education 12 0.3 13
Education 13-15 0.185
Education > = 16 0.179
Number of Observations 4142
tAutbors' tabulationsof 1989PSID.See text fordefinition of sample.
MIdollaramountsare in 1989 dollars.
1Uuless otherwise specified, all demographic characteristics arc for the head of household in 1989.Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Intact Households with SMSA Housing Prices, 1984-1989 1
Mean Standard
DeviationMedian MinimumMaximum
Total WeaJth, 1984 74477 207399 24956 -216200 5752500
Housing Wealth. 1984 41455 90802 14321 -13128 2252400
Non-Housing Wealth, 1984 33022 156676 6564 -273960 5633100
Total Wealth, 1989 100922 283206 35000 -72579 7460000
Housing Wealth, 1989 54154 105730 20000 -71319 2270000
Non-Housing Wealth, 1989 46768 227404 8153 -126800 6675000
TotalSavingsRate 84-89 0.080 0.311 0,026 -1.131 1.326
Housing Savings Rate 84-89 0.046 0.244 0.000 -1.577 1.736
Non-Housing Savings Rate 84-89 0.034 0.2 18 0.008 -1.873 1.489
Real Income1984-1989 183245 193901 147380 2657 4251000
MSAHousing Price, 1984 114356 26481 106371 67980 212996
MSAHousing Price, 1989 130952 53422 107680 74875 344670
Log(HPRY89/HPRY84) 0.092 0.218 0.063 -0.361 0.758
Age 49.9 14.8 47 30 97









Number of Observations 2331
1Authors' ubulations of1989 PSID.See text for definition of sanple.
2A11 dollar amounts are in 1989 dollars.
Unless otherwise specified, all demographic characteristics are for thebeadof household in 1989.Table 4a
ParameterEstimates for Savlng.s Rate Regressions
DependentVariable= TolalSavingsRole I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Con.suni -2.117 -5.864 .1.982 .137.838 -131.100 -147.397 -137.78$ -134.940
(6320) (6.664) (8.742) (36.849) (41.933) (42.293) (42.233) (42.198)
Age 0.472 0.407 0.347 0.265 0.115 0.034 .0.061 -0.193
(0.247) (0.249) (0.331) (0.330) (0.352) (0.362) (0.358) (0.359)
Agc2/lOO -0.319 -0.363 -0.339 .0.267 .0.133 .0.060 0.026 0.210
(0.225) (0,226) (0.306) (0.305) (0.325) (0.334) (0.332) (0.332)
Married 4.102 4.541 4.410 4.581 4.547 3.628 2.390
(1.751) (2.198) (2.190) (2.275) (2.276) (2.305) (2.299)
Black -1.363 -1.182 -1.460 .1.029 -1.043 -0.561 -0.476
(1.13$) (1.441) (1.437) (1.541) (3542) (1.531) (1.344)
Male 1.420 3.311 3.373 3.730 3.778 3488 2.982
(1.879) (2.306) (2.297) (2.386) (2.387) (2.383) (2.365)
Some High School -1.029 -2.984 -2.841 -3.123 -3.156 -3.151 -2.592
(1.800) (2.307) (2.298) (2.411) (2.413) (2.401) (2.390)
High School Graduate 1.330 -2.268 -2.133 -2.271 -2.336 -2.585 -2.238
(1.703) (2.209) (2.200) (2.309) (2.311) (2.309) (2.29$)
Some College 3.665 -2.378 -2.672 -2.276 .2.353 -2.892 -2.837
(1.912) (2.461) (2.452) (2.592) (2.596) (2.601) (2.586)
CollegeGrajuaLe 8.932 4.713 4.304 3.809 3.807 2.218 1.014
(2.004) (2.655) (2.647) (2.815) (2.816) (2.886) (2.887)
Health in 1984 -1.132 -1.473 -1.518 .0.776 -0.763 -0.503 -0.352
(0.495) (0.631) (0.628) (0.663) (0.664) (0.672) (0.668)
Lcg(HPRY89/HPRY84) 2 22.800 18.62.8 20.529 19.910 19.930
(2.905) (3.048) (4.111) (4.113) (4.077)
Log(}IPRY84/I00000) 2 13.631 13.256 13.10$ 12.326 11.940
(3.136) (3.622) (3.636) (3.637) (3.621)
Log(POPZO1POP7O) 2.357 2.439 1.819 3.764
(6.135) (6.141) (6.131) (6.086)
Log(HPgY8O/HPRY7O)1 -1.180 -1.120 -0.801 -0.364







Real Income 1984-1989 1.121 3.789
(l00000s) (0.459) (0.627)




AdjustedR-Squarcd 0.0027 0.0276 0.062! 0.0693 0.0631 0.0626 0.0654 0.0825
Number o(Obscrvation, 4142 4142 2331 2331 1996 1996 1996 1996
I Based onauthors'tabulations of the 1989 PSID.Sec (extfor description of sampleaeIciion.The dependene variable is the real savings rate
over the five year period1984-1989 whichis caicutaledby dividingthe change in real wealth byrealincome over the five year period.All
spccificazions include controls for age, sex, race, education. marital auaz. and health uatua of th. bead o(household. MI dollar antounU are
in1989dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Z ACCR.Ji data for tans-quality housing prices.
I Medianhomevalue (not quality adjusted) from decennial censtas by MSA.
Population by MSA from decennial cennas.Table Sa
Parameter Eimate3 for Savings RateRegressions
Dependent VariableHousingSavings Raie I
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
•l0.132 -11.288 -6.512 -155,981 .163.530 -161.486 -163.888 -181.460
(5.004) (5.313) (6.859) (28.855) (33.692)'
(33.982) (33.985) (34.071)
Age 0.679 0.618 0.465 0.387 0.393 0.337 0.397 0.521
(0.196) (0.198) (0.259) (0.258) (0.282) (0.291) (0.288) (0.290)
Age2fIOO -0.729 -0.629 -0.487 -0.418 .0.430 -0.377 -0.434 .0.499
(0.178) (0.181) (0.240) (0.239) (0.261) (0.268) (0.267) (0.268)
Macned 3.658 4.827 4.701 4.656 4.639 4.682 4.825
(1.396) (1.725) (1.715) (1.828) (1.829) (1.855) (1.856)
8lack 0.655 0.754 0.4.88 0.557 0.540 0.545 0.04.6
(0.921) (1.131) (1.125) (1.238) (1.239) (1.248) (1.247)
Male 0.371 0.671 0.739 1.2.34 1.267 1.240 1.2.50
(1.498) (1.809) (1.799) (1.917) (1.918) (1.919) (1.909)
Some High School -3.282 -4.386 -4.24.8 -4.659 -4.674 -4.658 -4.13$
(1.435) (1.310) (1.799) (1.937) (1.938) (1.938) (1.930)
HighSchoolGraduate -0.949 -3.309 -3.381 -3.960 -3.997 -3.952 -3.2.37
(1.357) (1.733) (1.723) (1.855) (1.837) (1.858) (1.853)
Some College 1.517 .2.361 -2.643 -2.677 -2.716 -2.661 -1.895
(1.524) (1.931) (1.920) (2.082) (2.086) (2.093) (2.088)
College Graduate 2.667 -1.802 -2.194 -2.014 .2.011 -1.971 -1.200
(1.598) (2.083) (2.073) (2.262) (2.263) (2.32.2) (2.331)
Hcaith in 1984 -0.485 -0.780 -0.824 -0.458 .0.447 -0.466 -0.594
(0.395) (0.495) (0.492) (0.533) (0.533) (0.541) (0.540)
Log(HPRY89/HPRY84) 2 22.536 18.535 15.609 15.626 16.016
(2.279) (2.387) (3.303) (3.310) (3.292)
Log(}{PRY84/I00000) 13.092 13.825 13.762 13.850 14.916
(2.456) (2.910) (2.921) (2.927) (2.924)
Log(P0P801P0P70) -4.802 -4.778 -4.787 -3.458
(4.929) (4.934) (4.933) (4.914)
Log(HPRY8O/HPRY7O)2 -0.590 -0.562 -0.600 -0.150







Real Income 1984-1989 -0.030 0.743
(l00000s) (0.370) (0.306)




Adjusted R-Squared 0.0082 0.0196 0.0572 0.0683 0.0600 0.0595 0.0597 0.0704
MumbcrofObscrvaiiona 4142 4142 2331 1331 1996 1996 1996 1996
IBasedonauthorstabulations o(thc 1989 PSID. Sec text for deacrçtion o(aaniple selection. The dependent variable is the real savings rate
over the lye year period 1984-1989 which La calculated by dividing the change in real wealth by ml income over the five year period. AU
ccificationa include contMs for age, sex, race, education, marital stew.., and health status of the bead of household. All dollar amounts are
its 1989 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
ACCRA dat.. forstint-qualitybowing prices. IMedianhome value (not quality adjusted)fromdecennial census by MSA.
8 Population by MSA from decennial census.Table 63
ParameterEstimates for SavingsRateRegression.s
DependentVariable =Non-Housbsg Savings Rate I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cunsunl 8.015 5.424 4.329 4.858 12.429 14.089 26.103 46.520
(4.821) (3.118) (6.245) (26.429) (29.919) (30.181) (30.086) (29.927)
Age -0.207 -0.211 -0.118 -0.122 -0.277 -0.303 -0.453 -0.716
(0.189) (0.191) (0.236) (0.237) (0.231) (0.238) (0.255) (0.253)
AgeI100 0.210 0.266 0.148 0.151 0.297 0.317 0.461 0.710
(0.172) (0.174) (0.218) (0.219) (0.232) (0.238) (0.236) (0.235)
Msriicd 0.445 -0.286 .0291 .0.075 .0.092 -1.054 -2.436
(1.34$) (1.370) (1.571) (1.623) (1.624) (1.642) (1.630)
Black -2.018 -1.937 -1.948 -1.586 -1.584 -1.106 -0.522
(0.887) (1.030) (1.031) (1.099) (1.100) (1.105) (1.09$)
Male 1.049 2.634 2.637 2.497 2.511 2.243 1.732
(1.443) (1.647) (1.647) (L702) (1.703) (1.699) (1.677)
Some High School 2.253 1.402 1.407 1.536 1.519 1.507 1.543
(1.382) (1.641) (1.648) (1.720) (1.722) (1.713) (1.695)
High School Gradusie 2.278 1.240 1.246 L689 1.660 1.367 1.000
(1.308) (1.578) (1.578) (1.647) (1.649) (1.64$) (1.621)
Some College 2.148 -0,017 -0.029 0.401 0.362 -0.231 -0.942
(1.469) (1.758) (1.759) (1.849) (1.852) (1.832) (1.834)
College Graduate 6.264 6.515 6.498 5.823 5.817 4.189 2.214
(1.539) (1.197) (1.898) (2008) (2.010) (2.056) (2.047)
Heafth in 1984 -0.647 -0.692 -0.694 -0.318 -0.316 .0.039 0.242
(0.380) (0.450) (0.451) (0.473) (0.474) (0.479) (0.474)
Log(}IPRY89/HPRY84) 0.264 0.093 4.920 4.215 3.915
(2.075) (2.186) (2.933) (2.930) (2.892)
Log(HPRY84/l00000) 1 0.559 -0.570 -0.654 -1.524 .2.977
(2.249) (2.584) (2.595) (2.391) (2.568)
Log(POP8O/POP7O) f 7.159 7.216 6.607 7.222
(4.377) (4.382) (4.367) (4316)
Log(HPRYIO/HPRY7O)! -0591 .0.558 .0.201 -0.214







Real Income 1984-1989 1.15? 3.046
(l00000a) (0.327) (0.444)
1984 Housing Wealth 1.786
(1000003) (0.606)
1984 Non-Housing Wealth -2.840
(l00000s) (0.393)
Adjusted R-Squarad 0.0001 0.0118 0.0206 0.0202 0.0152 0.0142 0.0208 0.0471
Number of Observations 4142 4142 2331 2331 1996 1996 1996 1996
I Based on authors' bu1aions or the 1989 PSID. See text tot dcscripiioo of sample selection. The dependent variable is the real savings rate
over the live year period 1984-1989 which is calculated by dividing the change in real wealth by real income over th. five year period. AU
specifications include conuol, tot age, sex, race. education, marital aius, and health ssaws of the bud of household. All dollar amounts are
in 1919 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses. IACCRAdata for constant-quality housing prices.
I Median borne value (no quality adjusted) (mm decennial census by MSA.
t Population by MSA from decennial census.Table 4b
Parameter Estimates for Savlogs Rate Regresslon.s
Depeudent Variable = TotalSavLigs Rate 1
(1) (2) (3)
Conatant 4.281 -106.709 -106.659
(9.262) (22.048) (23.046)
Age 0.177 0.142 0.093
(0.349) (0.348) (0.351)
AgeJl00 .0.194 -0.169 -0.114
(0.323) (0.321) (0.323)
Mamcd 5.355 5.440 4.527
(2.270) (2.258) (2.276)
Black -1.90! -1.349 .1.583
(1,506) (1.501) (1.522)
Male 3,158 3.212 4.016
(2.381) (2.368) (2.387)
Some High School .2.685 -2.502 -2.672
(2.412) (2.398) (2.415)
High School Graduate -1.76$ -1.854 .1.881
(2.296) (2.283) (2.307)
Some College -1.108 -1.918 .2.186
(2.574) (2.565) (2.590)
College Graduate 5.448 4.572 4.330
(2.793) (2.783) (2.805)
Health in 1984 .0.745 -0.725 -o.rn
(0.662) (0.659) (0.661)








Adjusted R-Squared 0.0582 0.0688 0.0663
NumberotObservations 2045 1045 2024
I Based on authors'tabulationso(the 1989 PSID. Sec text (or dcaccçtioo o(saauplc selection. The dependent variable
u the real savings rats over the rwc year period 1984-1989 which is calculated by dividing the change in rca] wealth by
teal income over the nycyearperiod. All qtccificaiions include controls (or age, sex, race, education, marital stews. and
besith stalus ot the bead o(heuacbold. All dollar amounts are in 1989 dollars. Standard errors arc in parentheses.
aMedian home value(notquality adjusted) (torn decennial census by MSA.
I Population by MSA (torn decennial census.Table Sb
Parameter E.stlznatei for Savings Rate Regre.sIons
DependentVariableHousing SavingsRate 1.
(I) (2) (3)
Concani .14.962 .107.416 -102.791
(7.414) (17.608) (18.423)
Age 0.452 0.419 0.307
(0.280) (0.278) (0.181)
Agc3IlOO .0.413 .0.464 353
(0.239) (0.257) (0.260)
M3rTICd 5.676 5.756 5.507
(1.817) (1.803) (1.820)
Black .0.104 0.41$ 0.423
(1.205) (1.199) (1.217)
Mate 0.357 0.408 0.763
(1.906) (1.891) (1.908)
Some High School .4.102 -3.930 .4.179
(1.930) (1.91$) (1.931)
HtghSchool Graduate .3.298 -3.382 .3.688
(1.837) (1.82.3) (1.84$)
Some College -1.461 -2.223 -2.557
(2.060) (2.048) (2.071)
College Graiiuare -0.931 .1.754 .2.04.8
(2.236) (2.223) (2.242)
Health in 1984 -0.341 -0.321 -0.382
(0.530) (0.526) (0.529)
Log(HPRY9O/HPRY8O) 2 12.945 15.126 14.316
(1.512) (1.547) (2.032)






AdjuttedR.Squsred 0.0535 0.0664 0.0638
Numberof Observations 2045 2045 2024
ABased on authors'tabulationsofthe 1989 PSID.Sc. text for descriptionor iamplc selection. Thedependent variable
is the real savingsrareoverthefly. year period 1984.1989 whieb is calculated by dividing the change in real wealth by
real income over the fiveyearperiod.All spcciflcalions includecontrols for age, sex, race, education,maritaluanaa, and
health tunas of theheadof household. All dollar amounts are In1989 dollars.Standarderrors are in parentheses.
2 Median home value (not quality adjust d)froen decennial census by MSA.
I Population by MSA from decennial census.Table 6b
Paranseter Esthnate3 for SJvbg3 Rate Regressions
Dependent Variable— Non-HousingSavings Rak I
(1) (2) (3)
Consunt 6.681 0.706 -3.868
(6.670) (13.972) (16.637)
Age -0.274 -0.276 -0.214
(0,2.32) (0.232) (0.234)
Agcf 100 0.294 0.295 0.239
(0.23)) (0.233) (0.233)
Marned -0.321 -0.316 -0.980
(1.635) (L635) (L645)
Black -1.797 -1764 -2.006
(1.084) (1.088) (1.100)
Male 2.801 2.804 3.233
(1.715) (1.715) (1.723)
SomeHigh School 1.417 1.428 1.507
(1.737) (1.737) (1.74.6)
High School Grsduatc 1.534 1.52.8 1.807
(1.653) (1.654) (1.668)
SomeCollege 0.353 0.304 0.371
(1.854) (1.858) (1.872)
Collegeraduaie 6.379 6.326 6.378
(2.011) (2.016) (2.027)
Healthin 1984 -0.404 -0.403 -0.395
(0.477) (0.477) (0.478)








Adjusted R-Squarcd 0.0172 0,0168 0.0164
Number of Obsetvatjo,u 2045 2045 2024
IBased on authors' tabulat ions o(thc $989 PSID. See ten (or deaciion of sample selection. The dependeni variable
is therealsavingsntcoverthe fiveyear period 1984-1989 which is calculated by dividing the change in real wealth by
tealincomeoverthe liveyear period, All specifications include conzrols (or age. sex. race, education, marital status, and
bealth status ofthehead o(houaehol4. All dollar smowus arein $989dollars. Standarderrors arcin parentheses.
Median homevalue(not qualityadjusted) (torn decennialcensusbyMSA.
I Population by MSA fromdecennialcensus.Appendix: Comparative Statics for the Housing Demand Mode!
This appendix analyzes the comparative statics of housing demand and savings in
the two-period mode!.Assumptions will be stated when they are first used, starting
with the following basic assumptions:
(1) U is strictly concave and non-decreasing with v8U(O,h) =-1-a, v/U(cO)=+,and
=0.
(ii)Housing and nonhou.sing consumption are normal goods; i.e., V8(cJSU/7hU) 0 and
hgh 0.
(iii) V is a constant relative risk aversion utility function; i.e., V(w) =CeW,
where C andare positive parameters.
(iv)Allvariables except P are in the consumer's initial information set i, and
given this information the consumer believes that P has a normal distribution with
mean and variance o.
Using the budget constraints (2) and (3) to eliminate A1, one has
(A.1) V,'2 =dhp(1-e+(l-m)PJ+
For notational shorthand, define
=
dhP1[l-e+(1-m)a] + [1 +r'J{ W1 +(1m)Y1lt1g(1.d)Rh-dhP(I-8 +)}








A.1Then, is the consumer's expected final wealth,is total initial wealth, cisthe
user cost of housing. q is a risk penalty, andappears in the expression for expected
utility of bequests:
(A.2) EV(W2/TV2) =
Substitutingthis expression ino the consumer's objective ftinction gives the problem
(A.3) MaxU(g,h) -C•i.
h,g






(V V)/v = b(1+r')c—
(cJhV)/V =bh--((1+r")R(1-d) +dP1c+ dhPq]
Similarly,


























which isnegative definite, and











bbThe deivacives need for comparative statics analysis are obtained by differentiath3g
the 1t-order conditions:
{} = C + + ARdR +
First, income/wealth effects satisfy
L',Cv b8v,.jU -bhVhgU - b-PqC•i =
dec(N)
- bglghU+ bhvggU
The terms bghU -
bh7hgU0 and bhv 8U bg7 gh7 0 by normality, along withb, < 0
imply that g and h are increasing in w.Let c(g,x) =âlog(g)/olog(x)denote the
elasticity of a variable g with respect to a variable x.The foUowing assumption
appears to be supported empirically:
(v)Theelasticities of g and h with respect to wareless than one:
This assumption implies
aA
____-gc(g,w)-((1-d)(1+r' )RJz + dhP (1-6 +]Jc(h,w) A
8w1+r 1 1
andforsuch that expected net equity 1-e+(1-cn) is positive,
=- (1+r')itgc(g,w)-&P[1-e+(1-m)]c(h,w)W
8w 1 1 2
A.4Second, increasing R has no effect on owners, and for renters satisfies
- bR(bgvhh








Then. 8h/âR <0.The cross-price effect ag/aR will be negative if g and h are not very
substitutable. and the income effect dominates. The effect of increasingRon financial
assets, and hence on savings, will be negative if h is ineLastic with respect toR and
the cross-price effect of R on g is weak.








bP1(- bgVghU+ bhVggV) c+2hP1q){bC'V-ggU)
Then oh/oP1 <0.The cross-price effect ag/oP1 is negative If g and h are not very
substitutable and the income effect dominates.The effects of increasing P1 on






If h is inelastic with respect to P1 and the cross-price effect of P1 on g is weak, then
aA1IaP1 is negative, and 3W13P1issmall negative.









When risk aversion is moderate, the leading terms will dominate, andag/aa and âh/öa
will bothbe positive.The effect of a onsatisfies
hP(1-m) +(1+r')ÔA/6a+
This expression is positive when risk aversion is moderate.
The preceding analysis assumed that theP1 and a varied independently.In
practice, the consumer will use the initial information, ineludingP1, in forming
expectations.If the consumer is rational, this dependence will reflect the statistical
dependence of P on P1.If the consumer is irrational, having for example naive
expectations that past rates of increase in prices reflected inP1 will continue, this
will also make a positively dependent onP1. A strong positive dependence of a on P1
will result in positive total effects of increasingP on A1 and W.
The analysis to this point has dealt with a single consumer, who is eitheran owner
or a renter. Now consider a population of consumers, identical except for heterogeneity
in beliefs about expected capital gains; i.e.,has a distribution over the population.
If supplies of rental and owner housing are fixed, then prices adjust toequilibrate
demand and supply, with consumers with high becoming owners. The comparative statics
of demand are then as foliows: An increase in R, and under usual circumstancesa
decrease in P1 or a shift upward in theof each consumer, will increase the utility of
owning, and lead at the margin to moves from renting to owning.If supplies are
completely inelastic, then this increase in demand for owning will be offset by a
combination of increasing R and decreasing P1.
A.6